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Executive Registry

77-576/10

2 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Stansfield Turner

SUBJECT: Responses to your Request for List of Problems and Issues Requiring your Immediate Attention

The ADCI recommends that you address the following actions and schedule the following briefings with representatives of the components listed below as soon as possible after your return from Europe:

1. Office of Legislative Counsel:

Approve return of the transcript of your confirmation hearings, as edited in a minor way, to SSCI, and review of commitments made by you during the session.

2. Office of General Counsel:

CIA relations with the Justice Department, especially the key pending cases: ITT/Chile, Moore and Boyce/Lee, and Bufkin. The role of the Attorney General under E.O. 11905.

3. Deputy Director for Operations:

Please note, in connection with Item 2 above, the ADCI's short memo to you which is attached.

Also attached is a list, in priority order, of topics Component heads would like to discuss with you at your earliest convenience. In the light of this list, it would be appropriate to schedule meetings with the representatives of those offices as soon as feasible.

OGC Has Reviewed

25X1

SA/DCI

ST

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1 March 1977

NOTE FOR: Admiral Turner

Stan:

I believe that your view concerning your priority attentions are well considered and on the mark.

In addition, however, to looking to the SecState, SecDef and NSC Advisor, you should add to them, I believe, the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. To me the most striking thing about the current and likely future state of American intelligence is the increasing impact of legal issues and findings concerning intelligence activities. This has taken DCIs more and more into the field of carrying out dialogue and negotiations with the Attorney General and there are a number of crunch issues and Catch 22s in this whole field. It is vitally important that you become aware of some of these issues, and I have asked General Counsel Tony Lapham to schedule some time for discussions of these matters with you looking ahead to a series of meetings between top CIA officials and top Justice officials so that a process of mutual education and understanding can take place.



E. H. Knoche

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NOTE: This is a summary list of priority items. The memos submitted by the components listed below are attached and tabbed.

OLC:

- a. Schedule briefings to prepare for NEIP budget hearings. (DCI first appearance 15 March.) Support provided by IC Staff and CIA Comptroller as required.
- b. Schedule meetings with appropriate Hill Committee Chairmen, especially Zablocki (House International Relations), Sparkman (Senate Foreign Relations), and Senator Case (Ranking Minority Member) for briefings on Covert Action and on the Cast Act requirements to report on certain CIA/foreign liaison agreements.
- c. Meeting with Speaker of the House to discuss question of House oversight arrangements.
- d. Attend Tuesday breakfasts at CIA for Congressmen.

OGC:

CIA (and other Community agencies) relations with the Intelligence Oversight Board under E.O. 11905.

D/DCI/IC:

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- a. [] (Intelligence Structure and Mission): issues and new approaches; related topics.
- b. Review of NIE 11-4 (Soviet Strategic Objectives) analysis.

NIO:

25X1

- a. [] Military Force Posture: problems of intelligence resource mobilization for this study. (IC Staff also will contribute.)

25X1

- b. NIE 4-1-77: Warning of War in Europe: its relation to []
- c. Pros and cons of the NIO system: the pressure on NIO staff created by tasks set by the new Administration, and related manpower needs.
- d. Intelligence support provided President Carter to date.

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A/DCI (Press):

- a. Scheduling of recommended DCI appearances for March.
- b. DCI approach to public affairs from CIA and Community viewpoints. Recommendations and request for guidance.

DDA:

25X1

b. FBI investigations of unauthorized disclosures: problem of Justice Department position that investigations should lead to possibility of prosecution. (OGC also will comment.)

c. FOIA burden: should CIA seek relief from Act? (OGC also will comment.)

d. Problem of rewriting of E.O. 10450 on Suitability Requirements for Government Employment: suggested version expected to be completed end March by OMB/Civil Service Commission probably will not meet Intelligence Community needs.

DDS&T:

No immediate problems, but would like to brief on DDS&T functions and resources, particularly those involving NRP and

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DDI: (No Tab)

No immediate problems or issues, although would contribute to NIO discussion of pros and cons of NIO system.

DDO:

No immediate problems except as discussed on covering memo.

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IG: (No Tab)

No immediate problems or issues, but will contribute as required, including OGC comments on CIA relations with IOB.

Comptroller:

No immediate problems; will be involved in budget briefings.

28 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Priority Problems and Issues
for Admiral Turner's Immediate
Attention

25X1 1. Admiral Turner wishes a prioritized list developed of problems and issues which will require his immediate attention after his return [] the night of 2 March. This memo is a request that each addressee prepare such a list of priority problems and issues, each item accompanied by a short descriptive paragraph, and deliver the list to the O/DCI by 1200 hours, Tuesday, 1 March. This office in consultation with ADCI will develop a master list for Admiral Turner's information, to be delivered to him the evening of 2 March.


2. To assist the development of these lists, Admiral Turner has cabled his views on the overall priority of effort concerning, "people to see and meetings to have," as follows:

- a. Preparation for twice weekly meeting with President.
- b. Preparation for NSC meetings.
- c. Preparation for PRC/SCC meetings.
- d. Congressional relations.
- e. Relations with NSC Advisors, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Attorney General/Justice Department.
- f. NFIB meetings, NFIB relations.
- g. Meetings with staffs (i.e., Community and Agency).
- h. Press relations.

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3. - It is expected that background material requests for the full briefing of Admiral Turner on particular problems and issues will be prepared and held in the offices concerned until required by O/DCI.

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SA/DCI

Distribution:

ADCI

D/DCI/IC

D/DCI/NI

DDA

DDO

DDS&T

DDI

OLC

OGC

IG

Comptroller

A/DCI

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087-479

15 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Morning Meeting Participants

SUBJECT : Information for and about Admiral Turner

25X1 1. As indicated in a memorandum from Ben Evans, Admiral Turner and his staff have moved to Room 345, Old EOB. Telephone numbers are: [redacted] In all likelihood, Admiral Turner will maintain a permanent office in EOB after confirmation and even after the IC Staff moves into the new building.

25X1 2. The confirmation hearing is scheduled to take place on Tuesday, 22 February. Admiral Turner plans to depart for Naples that night; make farewell and courtesy calls within his NATO command and return to Washington on Thursday, 3 March. [redacted]

3. In a conversation with Mr. Knoche yesterday, Admiral Turner made the following comments and asked for the following information:

25X1 a. Admiral Turner intends to send his opening statement to the SSCI by COB Wednesday and welcomes suggestions. (NOTE: Our consolidated comments and suggestions for the opening statement were sent to the Admiral's office this morning.

[redacted] has assured me that these suggestions will be taken into account by Admiral Turner and we will have an opportunity to review the final draft before it goes to the SSCI.)

b. During Mr. Bush's confirmation hearing, Senator Thurmond submitted eight questions which required written responses from Mr. Bush. Admiral Turner wishes to have the transcript of the questions and answers. (ACTION: OLC)

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c. Admiral Turner requested further clarification as to the distinction between counterintelligence and the internal security practices of the Agency. In specific terms, Admiral Turner wishes to know how we divide these functions organizationally and doctrinally. He also raised the following questions:

(1) What operational use is made of unwitting Americans abroad?

(2) What may and may not be done against U.S. citizens abroad under present guidelines, including electronic and physical surveillance of U.S. citizens?

(3) What are the basic principles of counter-intelligence? (ACTION: DDO in collaboration with DDA/OS) (NOTE: In response to this question, we can refer Admiral Turner to briefing materials already sent to him.)

d. As Mr. Knoche indicated at the Morning Meeting, Admiral Turner plans to have short but regular substantive meetings with the President on significant issues of special interest. When Admiral Turner returns in early March, he would like to have about 15 topics suitable for such discussions. (NOTE: Mr. Knoche discussed this request with Messrs. Walsh and Lehman who will collaborate on the preparation of these topics. Addressees are invited to submit additional suggested topics to Mr. Walsh.)

e. A question and answer dry run for Admiral Turner is planned for Wednesday or Thursday with Vice President Mondale and Messrs. Hamilton Jordan, James Schlesinger and Hank Knoche. (ACTION: A set of the Q&A's now being prepared by OLC for Admiral Turner should be made available to Mr. Knoche prior to this meeting.)

4. Summing up, Admiral Turner appears to be pleased with the material forwarded to him to date. [redacted] stated that he was particularly impressed with the budget presentation. Sometime today I expect to receive from [redacted] the following items for our review and comment:

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a. Admiral Turner's financial statement for the SSCI so that the General Counsel can prepare a Conflict of Interest Certification for the SSCI.

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- b. A copy of Admiral Turner's draft opening statement.
- c. A set of Q&A's prepared by Admiral Turner and his staff.



25X1

Special Assistant
to the DDCI

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		15 Feb 77
TO: Ben Evans		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM		
ROOM		

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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2/22

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77-516

17 February 1977

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT: Admiral Turner's Itinerary,
22 February - 2 March 1977

1. Admiral Turner and party will depart Andrews AFB at 1950 hours, 22 February via VC-135 aircraft. The aircraft will be utilized for subsequent flights through 26 February. Return flight to CONUS will be via similar type aircraft, departing Naples 1430 hours on 2 March 1977 and arriving Andrews AFB the same day at 2130 hours.

Following provided:

22-26 February --

Tail Number: 24130

Pilot: Major Bruce Tobias, USAF

2 March --

Tail Number: 4126

2. Visit to Rome 28 February via Navy T-39 aircraft.
3. More detailed information to follow.

Enc: Detailed itinerary (all times local)

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Copy 5

19 February 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith:

25X1

1. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from General Counsel dated 17 February 1977; Subject: Authority for CIA to Provide Support for the IC Staff.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

2. Replacement page VII-1 for FY 78 Congressional Budget (CIA) forwarded on 9 February 1977.

[Redacted]

25X1

3. Copy of memorandum to Acting DCI from Secretary of Defense Brown dated 15 February 1977; Subject: NATO/Warsaw Pact Defense Spending. (Mr. Knoche asked that this memorandum be shown to Admiral Turner.)

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4. General daily news clippings.

[Redacted]

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Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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[Redacted]

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

7D5611

2.

3.

4.

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7.

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13.

14.

15.

Seymour,

Attached is a paper on the authority of the Agency to provide support for the IC Staff which Admiral Turner has requested.

Anthony A. Lapham

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TO		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
25X1					
25X1	DDCI		X		
25X1			X		
25X1					
25X1	L. Lapham				
	J. Taylor				

SUSPENSE _____
Date _____

Remarks:

A tough, but not
unexpected task
from SECDEF.

OKAY, let's
arrange a
letter of
response by 2/25.

Date

copy to Adm. Turner
for info.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

77-3418

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

FEB 15 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NATO/Warsaw Pact Defense Spending

This memorandum reaffirms the importance the Department of Defense attaches to both the continuation of the CIA's recent efforts to systematically compare U.S. and Soviet military programs and to the expansion of such efforts to include other countries important to U.S. national security planning. Comparative costing of NATO and Warsaw Pact military programs is of particular near term importance.

CIA's dollar cost comparisons of U.S. and Soviet defense activities have become a focal point of attention in the current public discussion of trends in the military balance. Unfortunately one result of this highlighting of U.S. and Soviet efforts has been a de facto de-emphasis of the relative defense contributions of the non-US NATO and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations.

In line with the Carter administration's stated intention of increasing the U.S. commitment to NATO I believe it is important that we start to place examination of the military balance into better perspective by ensuring adequate attention to NATO vs. Warsaw Pact. Accordingly, I request that you initiate work to develop a dollar cost comparison of total NATO and total Warsaw Pact defense activities using a methodology as similar as feasible to that employed for the US/USSR analysis.

I recognize there are some difficult methodological and data problems associated with this effort. Aside from the difficulties of cost comparisons in different economic systems and the question of how cost translates into effectiveness in a given country, any use of the results would also have to examine questions of additivity of capability in each alliance. Among other matters this involves the degree of common planning, interoperability, and reliability of the forces. Nevertheless, it would be most desirable to have an interim report, even if its conclusions are tentative, completed by mid-April 1977 for use in preparing for the Spring NATO ministerial meetings. My staff will of course make available to you any relevant data on allied forces which may be in hand.

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If this deadline is too constraining for a complete analysis, initial efforts should be focused on comparisons of military investment (RDT&E, procurement of weapons and equipment, and construction of facilities), with personnel and other operating costs to follow by mid-May.

Harold Brown

cc: Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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Cy #5

17 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith:

1. A proposed list of topics for Presidential briefings. Mr. Knoche suggests that Admiral Turner might wish to read these prior to his meeting with the President at noon tomorrow. 25X1
2. Memorandum for Admiral Turner regarding Certification of Non-Conflict of Interest from the General Counsel.

/s/
[Redacted]
Special Assistant
to DDCI

25X1

Attachments

[Redacted]

Distribution:

O - Addressee

1 - [Redacted]

1 - [Redacted]

1 - ES w/covering memo to att

1 - ES w/covering memo to att

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Washington, D.C. 20505

2-17-77

Stan —

A proposed list of
topics for your
eventual briefing
of the President.

Looks good to me.

May be of some
use in your luncheon
meeting tomorrow.

H. Knoche

P.S. The first four were
particularly selected to get
the series off on a strong start.

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~Top Secret~~

(Security Classification)

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Restricted to
specific activities:

~~Top Secret~~

(Security Classification)

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Executive Secretariat
77-514

17 February 1977

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith:

[Redacted]

2. General daily news clippings. [Redacted]
3. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from DDI dated 17 February 1977; Subject: CIA Support to U.S. MBFR Delegation. Note: This answers Admiral Turner's request of 15 February 1977 to DDI regarding Ambassador Resor of MBFR Delegation letter to the Admiral of 9 February 1977. [Redacted]
4. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from OGC dated 16 February 1977; Subject: Responsibilities of the DCI with Respect to the Intelligence Community. [Redacted]
Note: This answers Admiral Turner's question of 12 February 1977 to OGC.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]
Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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[Redacted]

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NEWSDAY

13 FEBRUARY 1977

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 10A5-4

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Head lines



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2/16

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77-497

16 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:





25X

SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith:

25X



3. Sealed envelope from CIA Operations Center to Admiral Turner.
4. General daily news clippings. 
5. Memorandum from Special Assistant to the DCI dated 16 February 1977; Subject: Admiral Turner's Question re the Chapter of the Church Committee's Report which concerns the "Organization of the Intelligence Community as a Whole!" 

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6. Memorandum for SA/DDCI from Director of Security and the Chief, Counterintelligence Staff dated 16 February 1977:

Subject: Information for Admiral Turner.

25X

Note: This answers, in part, the question raised by Admiral Turner regarding the difference between the Internal Security and Counterintelligence functions of the Agency. A more detailed explanation of counterintelligence was included in the briefing book on the Operations Directorate (DDO) forwarded to you on 10 February under a tab entitled "Counterintelligence Role of CIA." Also included are responses to other questions on guidelines and criteria for operations involving or directed against American citizens.

7. Sealed envelope from Admiral Murphy to Admiral Turner.

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Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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
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16 February 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

Special Assistant to the DCI

SUBJECT:

Admiral Turner's Question re the Chapter of the Church Committee's Report Which Concerns the "Organization of the Intelligence Community as a Whole"

1. Attached are excerpts from the Church Committee Report which discuss the organization of the Intelligence Community: Chapter "E: The Director of Central Intelligence" and Chapter "G: Reorganization of the Intelligence Community." What follows is a brief summary of these two chapters and their recommendations, as well as some comments on what we understand to be the current views of the SSCI (Inouye Committee) on the same subjects.

2. Chapter E considers the DCI in his three roles as coordinator of the Intelligence Community, producer of National Intelligence, and head of the CIA.

a. DCI as coordinator: the Committee comments that the DCI is not in a position to command the different departments and agencies concerned with intelligence to respond to the needs of policymakers because he lacks authority to allocate intelligence resources. The Committee supports the CFI concept but wonders if the CFI can be effective--for example, in enabling the DCI to review tactical military intelligence operations--without modification of the peacetime authority of the Secretary of Defense.

b. DCI as producer of National Intelligence: the Committee comments that the DCI faces obstacles in ensuring objectivity in his national intelligence judgments because of "pressures

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from the White House and the Defense Department," and that the DCI's ability to resist such pressures was reduced with the dissolution of the Board of National Estimates. The Committee also emphasizes the importance of ensuring both the DCI's proximity and access to the President and his responsibility for Intelligence Community activities. The Committee notes that the appropriate Congressional committees should be provided with the full range of intelligence produced by the Community, and that procedures should be developed so that the DCI's role as an adviser to the President is not compromised.

c. DCI as head of CIA: the Committee notes that the DCI might find himself in a "conflict of interest" situation when ruling on the activities of the Community because of his direct management responsibility for CIA and, furthermore, that the DCI's "span of control" may be too great for him to exercise, in addition, detailed supervision of the clandestine activities of the CIA.

3. Chapter E also includes several recommendations: namely, that by statute the DCI be given exclusive responsibility for producing National Intelligence, and that he establish a board including senior outside advisers who would review the intelligence product, thereby helping insulate the DCI from pressures to modify his judgments; that the DCI by statute be authorized to establish national intelligence requirements, prepare the intelligence budget, and provide guidance for all national intelligence program operations, and that to do so, the DCI should have authority to review all intelligence resource allocations, including those for tactical military intelligence; that statutory authority for the DCI's two deputies be established, and that only one of the three be an active or retired career military officer; that the oversight committee consider (1) that funds for the national intelligence budget be appropriated to the DCI rather than the different agencies and departments, and (2) that the DCI be separated from direct responsibility over the CIA.

4. Chapter G--"The Reorganization of the Intelligence Community"--expands on the question of separating the DCI from direct management of CIA. Noting that such a separation would remove the DCI from any conflict of interest in exercising his authority over the entire Intelligence Community, the Committee also suggests that major structural changes in CIA be considered: namely, by separating national intelligence production and analysis from "the clandestine service." The Committee lists the

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advantages and potential disadvantages of this latter proposition, and concludes with a recommendation that the appropriate Congressional oversight committees study both questions.

5. We understand that the SSCI (Inouye Committee) continues the concern of the Church Committee regarding the DCI's roles as coordinator of the Community, producer of National Intelligence, and head of CIA. Some impressions gathered by the Intelligence Community Staff and the Office of Legislative Counsel regarding the thinking in the Inouye Committee include:

a. DCI as coordinator, or Community Resource Manager:

Although the Church Committee strongly endorsed this concept, it noted that shaping a committee process which respected the direct executive powers of both the Secretary of Defense and the DCI presented a problem. The Inouye Committee generally favors the CFI and the consolidated NFIP budget process which resulted from E.O. 11905. While the Church Committee recommended founding this process in legislation, the Inouye Committee wishes further testing of the existing process before taking a position on the question of legislation.

In addition, the Inouye Committee is interested in the DCI's power to establish Community collection requirements--already substantial in the imagery and SIGINT fields. Along with the House Appropriations Committee, the Inouye Committee would like to further investigate the question of DCI oversight of tactical military intelligence operations in order to eliminate wasteful duplication.

The Inouye Committee's Charters and Guidelines Subcommittee (Senator Hathaway) is drafting an "overall charter" for the Community and it is possible that proposed legislation could be ready by late spring. Also, the Carter Administration intends to review Community organization through a Policy Review Memorandum [redacted] which will examine the powers of the DCI to manage Community resources either through committee negotiation (as in the CFI's successor organization, the Policy Review Committee/Intelligence) or through direct executive authority, such as the DCI now has over the CIA.

b. DCI as producer of National Intelligence:

Given the fact that there is general agreement that the DCI should be the principal foreign intelligence adviser to the

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President and the NSC, there continues to be controversy both about the quality and objectivity of national intelligence produced under present arrangements and about various measures that could be taken to improve the situation. As noted above, the Church Committee criticized the dissolution of the Board of National Estimates because it believed the Board helped insulate the DCI from policy pressures. The Inouye Committee has not yet taken a position on this subject. We understand that Senator Stevenson's Subcommittee on Intelligence Collection, Production, and Quality is preparing a study for the Committee's consideration on this issue and that it is to be ready at the end of February. This staff preparing the study is pursuing an in-depth investigation of intelligence production in several areas, including Soviet forces for intercontinental conflict--the NIE 11-3/8 series. In this connection, it should be noted that the Inouye Committee as a whole was briefed fully on the controversy surrounding the recent "B-Team" experiment and the false press charges that outside "hard-liners" had succeeded in forcing changes in the judgments of this particular NIE. Because of their positive reactions to these briefings, we believe the Committee members are not now overly concerned about estimative objectivity, but undoubtedly will develop specific recommendations designed to further reinforce the independence of the estimating process and its end product.

The Inouye Committee also is aware, from meetings with former DCI George Bush, that the DCI was considering the formation of a body of outside consultants to be called the Director's Estimates Advisory Panel. This Panel would be composed of experts in various disciplines from the academic, business, and "think-tank" worlds who would be called upon to provide non-Intelligence Community views of selected Estimates. Whether or not to proceed with the formation of such a Panel remains a decision for the new DCI.

c. DCI as head of CIA:

Concerning the Church Committee's recommendation that serious consideration be given to separating the DCI from direct responsibility for managing CIA, the Inouye Committee's Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines continues to look into the question. Although we do not know what the general view of the Committee currently is, it is probable Committee members must

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first answer a more basic question: in his role as Community leader, how much of the DCI's authority should be directly executive and how much should be expressed through negotiation with other agencies and departments (primarily Defense) which retain executive control of particular national intelligence elements and programs?

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- 1 - ES
- 1 - ER
- 1 - OLC
- 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 1 - D/DCI/NI
- 1 - DDI

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(E) THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The 1947 National Security Act gave the DCI responsibility for "coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security." In addition, the DCI as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser was given responsibility for coordinating and producing national intelligence for senior policymakers. However, the Committee found that these DCI responsibilities have often conflicted with the particular interests and prerogatives of the other intelligence community departments and agencies. They have not given up control over their own intelligence operations, and in particular the Department of Defense and the military services, which allocate 80 percent of the direct costs for national intelligence, have insisted that they must exercise direct control over peacetime intelligence activities to prepare for war. Thus, while the DCI was given responsibility under the 1947 act for intelligence community activities, he was not authorized to centrally coordinate or manage the overall operations of the community.

1. Coordinator of the Intelligence Community

The Committee has found that the DCI in his coordinator role has been unable to ensure that waste and unnecessary duplication are avoided. Because the DCI only provides guidance for intelligence collection and production, and does not establish requirements, he is not in a position to command the intelligence community to respond to the intelligence needs of national policymakers. Where the DCI has been able to define priorities, he has lacked authority to allocate intelligence resources—either among different systems of intelligence collection or among intelligence collection, analysis and finished intelligence production.

The Committee supports President Ford's objectives of enhancing the stature of the DCI and establishing a mechanism such as the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) with the DCI as chairman to control the allocation of national intelligence programs resources. The Committee questions, however, whether the CFI can be effective without some appropriate modification of the peacetime authority of the Secretary of Defense. In order to strike an appropriate balance between the requirements of national and tactical intelligence, the intelligence collected by national means should be readily available to the military commanders and vice versa, and the Secretary of Defense and the military services should retain direct control over the operations of tactical military intelligence. Nonetheless, the DCI needs the right to review tactical military intelligence operations in order to make budget choices between tactical and national intelligence activities. Moreover, to carry out his coordinating role, the DCI needs to retain control over major technical intelligence collection systems which service both tactical and national intelligence requirements.

2. Producer of National Intelligence

In the area of providing finished intelligence, the Committee discovered that the DCI, in his role as intelligence adviser, has faced obstacles in ensuring that his national intelligence judgments are objective and independent of department and agency bias.

has been particularly concerned with pressures from both the White House and the Defense Department on the DCI to alter his intelligence judgments. One example of such pressure investigated by the Committee occurred in the fall of 1969 when the DCI modified his judgment on the capability of the Soviet SS-9 system when it conflicted with the public position of Secretary of Defense Laird. After a meeting with staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director Helms deleted a paragraph from the draft of the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic forces which stated that within the next five years it was "highly unlikely" that the Soviets would attempt to achieve "a first strike capability, i.e., a capability to launch a surprise attack against the United States with assurance that the U.S.S.R. would not itself receive damage it would regard as unacceptable."

The Committee believes that over the past five years the DCI's ability to produce objective national intelligence and resist outside pressure has been reduced with the dissolution of the independent Board of National Estimates and the subsequent delegation of its staff to the departments with responsibility for drafting the DCI's national intelligence judgments.

In the end, the DCI must depend on his position as the President's principal intelligence adviser or on his personal relationship with the President to carry out his various responsibilities and to withstand pressures to compromise his intelligence judgments. Consequently, the Committee has been concerned that the DCI's proximity and access to the President has diminished over the years. Since 1969, at least until the confirmation of Mr. Bush, the DCI has rarely seen the President except at NSC meetings. The influence a DCI could have from a close relationship with the President has generally been lacking.

While President Ford's Executive Order is a step in the right direction, the Committee believes that the DCI's responsibility over intelligence community activities should be enhanced and spelled out clearly and in detail in statute. The Executive should not continue defining these responsibilities alone as it has done since 1947 through Executive Orders and National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs).

The Committee believes that the Congress, in carrying out its responsibilities in the area of national security policy, should have access to the full range of intelligence produced by the United States intelligence community. The Committee further believes that it should be possible to work out a means of ensuring that the DCI's national intelligence judgments are available to the appropriate Congressional committees on a regular basis without compromising the DCI's role as personal adviser to the President.

Finally, the Committee has found concern that the function of the DCI in his roles as intelligence community leader and principal intelligence adviser to the President is inconsistent with his responsibility to manage one of the intelligence community agencies—the CIA. Potential problems exist in a number of areas. Because the DCI as head of the CIA is responsible for human clandestine collection operations, the development of CIA-RDP80M00165A002600020008-7

and interception of technical collection systems, there is concern that the DCI as community leader is in "a conflict of interest" situation when ruling on the activities of the overall intelligence community.

The Committee is also concerned that the DCI's new span of control—both the entire intelligence community and the entire CIA—may be too great for him to exercise effective detailed supervision of clandestine activities.

Recommendations

16. By statute, the DCI should be established as the President's principal foreign intelligence adviser, with exclusive responsibility for producing national intelligence for the President and the Congress. For this purpose, the DCI should be empowered to establish a staff directly responsible to him to help prepare his national intelligence judgments and to coordinate the views of the other members of the intelligence community. The Committee recommends that the Director establish a board to include senior outside advisers to review intelligence products as necessary, thus helping to insulate the DCI from pressures to alter or modify his national intelligence judgments. To advise and assist the DCI in producing national intelligence, the DCI would also be empowered to draw on other elements of the intelligence community.

17. By statute, the DCI should be given responsibility and authority for establishing national intelligence requirements, preparing the national intelligence budget, and providing guidance for United States national intelligence program operations. In this capacity he should be designated as chairman of the appropriate NSC committee, such as the CFI, and should have the following powers and responsibilities:

a. The DCI should establish national intelligence requirements for the entire intelligence community. He should be empowered to draw on intelligence community representatives and others whom he may designate to assist him in establishing national intelligence requirements and determining the success of the various agencies in fulfilling them. The DCI should provide general guidance to the various intelligence agency directors for the management of intelligence operations.

b. The DCI should have responsibility for preparing the national intelligence program budget for presentation to the President and the Congress.* The definition of what is to be included within that national intelligence program should be established by Congress in consultation with the Executive. In this capacity, the Director of Central Intelligence should be involved early in the budget cycle in preparing the budgets of the respective intelligence community agencies. The Director should have specific responsibility for choosing among the programs of the different collection and production agencies and departments and to insure against waste and unnecessary duplication. The DCI should also have responsibility for issuing fiscal guidance for the allocation of all national intelligence resources. The authority of the

* [The DCI] shall: Ensure the development and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI. (Executive Order 11905, Sec. 3(d)(ii).)

DCI to reprogram funds within the intelligence budget should be defined by statute.¹⁰

c. In order to carry out his national intelligence responsibilities the DCI should have the authority to review all foreign and military intelligence activities and intelligence resource allocations, including tactical military intelligence which is the responsibility of the armed forces.¹¹

d. The DCI should be authorized to establish an intelligence community staff to support him in carrying out his managerial responsibilities. This staff should be drawn from the best available talent within and outside the intelligence community.

e. In addition to these provisions concerning DCI control over national intelligence operations in peacetime, the statute should require establishment of a procedure to insure that in time of war the relevant national intelligence operations come under the control of the Secretary of Defense.

18. By statute, the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the intelligence community should be established as recommended in Executive Order 11905. This Deputy Director should be subject to Senate confirmation and would assume the DCI's intelligence community functions in the DCI's absence. Current provisions regarding the status of the DCI and his single deputy should be extended to cover the DCI and both deputies. Civilian control of the nation's intelligence is important; only one of the three could be a career military officer, active or retired.

19. The Committee recommends that the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress consider whether the Congress should appropriate the funds for the national intelligence budget to the DCI, rather than to the directors of the various intelligence agencies and departments.

20. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence should serve, at the pleasure of the President but for no more than ten years.

21. The Committee also recommends consideration of separating the DCI from direct responsibility over the CIA.¹²

F. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1. The Charter for Intelligence Activities: Espionage, Counterintelligence and Covert Action

The Committee finds that the CIA's present charter, embodied in the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949, and the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, is inadequate in a number of respects.

¹⁰ "Reprogramming" means shifting money previously approved for one purpose to another use; for instance, from clandestine human collection to technical collection or covert action.

¹¹ In contrast to President Nixon's 1971 letter to Director Helms which asked the DCI to plan and review "... all intelligence activities including tactical intelligence and the allocation of all intelligence resources," President Ford's Executive Order 11905 states that "... neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for tactical intelligence."

¹² See discussion on pp. 449-450.

executive should continue to have the initiative in formulating covert action, it also strongly believes that the appropriate oversight bodies of Congress should be fully informed prior to the initiation of such actions.

Congressional power over the purse can serve as the most effective congressional oversight tool if there is the courage and the will to exercise it. In addition to the regular budget for covert action, the Agency draws on a Contingency Reserve Fund for unanticipated projects. Any withdrawals from this fund require approval from the Office of Management and Budget and notification, within 48 hours, to the appropriate congressional committees. The Committee believes that the Contingency Fund can also provide one of the mechanisms by which Congress can effectively control covert action.

Recommendations

35. The legislation establishing the charter for the Central Intelligence Agency should specify that the CIA is the only U.S. Government agency authorized to conduct covert actions. The purpose of covert actions should be to deal with grave threats to American security. Covert actions should be consistent with publicly-defined United States foreign policy goals, and should be reserved for extraordinary circumstances when no other means will suffice. The legislation governing covert action should require executive branch procedures which will ensure careful and thorough consideration of both the general policies governing covert action and particular covert action projects; such procedures should require the participation and accountability of highest level policymakers.

36. The Committee has already recommended, following its investigation of alleged assassination attempts directed at foreign leaders, a statute to forbid such activities. The Committee reaffirms its support for such a statute and further recommends prohibiting the following covert activities by statute:

- All political assassinations.²⁰
- Efforts to subvert democratic governments.
- Support for police or other internal security forces which engage in the systematic violation of human rights.

37. By statute, the appropriate NSC committee (e.g., the Operations Advisory Group) should review every covert action proposal.²¹ The Committee recommends that the Operations Advisory Group review include:

- A careful and systematic analysis of the political premises underlying the recommended actions, as well as the nature, extent, purpose, risks, likelihood of success, and costs of the operation. Reasons explaining why the objective can-

²⁰ The Committee endorses Executive Order 11905, of February 28, 1976, which states: "No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination."

²¹ Executive Order 11905, 2/18/76, established the Operations Advisory Group and directed it to "consider and develop a policy recommendation, including any dissents, for the President prior to his decision on each special activity [e.g., covert operations] in support of national foreign policy."

not be achieved by overt means should also be considered. Each covert action project should be formally considered at a meeting of the OAG, and if approved, forwarded to the President for final decision. The views and positions of the participants would be fully recorded. For the purpose of OAG, presidential, and congressional considerations, all so-called non-sensitive projects should be aggregated according to the extraordinary circumstances or contingency against which the project is directed.

38. By statute, the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress should require that the annual budget submission for covert action programs be specified and detailed as to the activity recommended. Unforeseen covert action projects should be funded from the Contingency Reserve Fund which could be replenished only after the concurrence of the oversight and any other appropriate congressional committees. The congressional intelligence oversight committees should be notified prior to any withdrawal from the Contingency Reserve Fund.

39. By statute, any covert use by the U.S. Government of American citizens as combatants should be preceded by the notification required for all covert actions. The statute should provide that within 60 days of such notification such use shall be terminated unless the Congress has specifically authorized such use. The Congress should be empowered to terminate such use at any time.²²

40. By statute, the executive branch should be prevented from conducting any covert military assistance program (including the indirect or direct provision of military material, military or logistics advice and training, and funds for mercenaries) without the explicit prior consent of the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress.

C. REORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

1. The Position of the DCI

The Committee recommendations regarding the Director of Central Intelligence (pages 43-45) would, if implemented, increase his authority over the entire intelligence community. Given such increased authority, the Committee believes that both the executive branch and the intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress should give careful consideration to removing the DCI from direct management responsibility for the Central Intelligence Agency. This would free the DCI to concentrate on his responsibilities with regard to the entire intelligence community and would remove him from any conflict of interest in performing that task. It might also increase the accountability of the Central Intelligence Agency by establishing a new and separate senior position—a Director of the Central Intelligence Agency—responsible for only the CIA.

2. The Structures of the CIA

The Committee believes that several important problems uncovered in the course of this inquiry suggest that serious consideration also be given to major structural change in the CIA—in particular, sepa-

²² Current provisions of the War Powers Resolution which could be so amended. (Appendix C, Hearings, Vol. 7, p. 226.)

rating national intelligence production and service and other collection functions. Intelligence production could be placed directly under the DCI, while clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from human and technical sources and covert operations would remain in the CIA.

The advantages of such a step are several:

- The DCI would be removed from the conflict of interest situation of managing the intelligence community as a whole while also directing a collection agency.
- The concern that the DCI's national intelligence judgments are compromised by the impulse to justify certain covert action operations or by the close association of the analysts with the clandestine service would be remedied.
- The problem, seen by some in the intelligence community, of bias on the part of CIA analysts toward the collection resources of the CIA would be lessened.
- It would facilitate providing the intelligence production unit with greater priority and increased resources necessary for improving the quality of its finished intelligence.
- Tighter policy control of the Clandestine Service by the National Security Council and the Department of State would be possible.
- The Director would be able to focus increased attention on monitoring Clandestine Services.
- Internal reorganization of the Directorate for Intelligence and the remainder of the CIA could be facilitated.

There are potential drawbacks as well:

- The Director of Central Intelligence might lose the influence that is part of having command responsibility for the clandestine services.
- The increasing, though still not extensive, contact between national intelligence analysts and the Clandestine Service for the purpose of improving the espionage effort might be inhibited.
- The DCI would have managerial responsibility over the former CIA analysts which might place him in a conflict-of-interest situation in regard to the production of intelligence.
- The increased number of independent agencies would increase the DCI's coordination problems.
- If the clandestine services did not report to the DCI, there would be the problem of establishing an alternative chain of command to the President.
- The Clandestine Service might be downgraded and fail to secure adequate support.

Nonetheless, on balance, the Committee believes such a separation of functions and consequent possible realignments in authority within the intelligence community merit serious consideration.

41. The intelligence oversight committee(s) of Congress in the course of developing a new charter for the intelligence community should give consideration to separating the functions of the DCI and the Director of the CIA and to dividing the intelligence analysis and production functions from the clandestine collection and covert action functions of the present CIA.

H. RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE CITIZENS

In the immediate postwar period, as the communists pressed to influence and to control international organizations and movements, mass communications, and cultural institutions, the United States responded by involving American private institutions and individuals in the secret struggle over minds, institutions, and ideals. In the process, the CIA subsidized, and even helped develop "private" or non-government organizations that were designed to compete with communists around the world. The CIA supported not only foreign organizations, but also the international activities of United States student, labor, cultural, and philanthropic organizations.

These covert relationships have attracted public concern and this Committee's attention because of the importance that Americans attach to the independence of these institutions.

The Committee found that in the past the scale and diversity of these covert actions has been extensive. For operational purposes, the CIA has:

- Funded a special program of a major American business association;
- Collaborated with an American trade union federation;
- Helped to establish a research center at a major United States university;
- Supported an international exchange program sponsored by a group of United States universities;
- Made widespread use of philanthropic organizations to fund such covert action programs.

The Committee's concern about these relationships is heightened by the Agency's tendency to move from support to use of both institutions and individuals. For example, the initial purpose of the Agency's funding of the National Student Association was to permit United States students to represent their own ideas, in their own way, in the international forums of the day. Nevertheless, the Committee has found instances in which the CIA moved from general support to the "operational use" of individual students.²² Contrary to the public's understanding, over 250 United States students were sponsored by the CIA to attend youth festivals in Moscow, Vienna and Helsinki and

²² Operational use, according to CIA directives, means performing services in support of the CIA Operations Directorate, and may include the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual for such purposes as providing cover and collecting intelligence.

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16 FEB
1977

CI 123-77

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDCI
VIA : Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Operations
FROM : Director of Security
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff
SUBJECT : Information for Admiral Turner

Forwarded herewith is a joint response to your request incorporated in the morning meeting notes of 15 February 1977, paragraph 3.c.

[Redacted Signature]

Robert W. Gambino

[Redacted Content]

Attachment: a/s

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What May or May Not be Done Against U.S. Citizens
(U.S. Persons) Abroad Under Present Guidelines,
Including Electronic Surveillance and Physical
Surveillance of U.S. Citizens?

The Central Intelligence Agency as a foreign intelligence agency is authorized to collect certain information concerning the foreign activities of U.S. persons. This authority to collect information is found in Executive Order 11905, Section 4(b). Under this authority, this Agency collects information concerning U.S. persons provided: (a) it is foreign intelligence information; (b) it is counterintelligence information or information about a U.S. person who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power; (c) it is information that the U.S. person is engaging in international terrorist activities or is engaging in international narcotics activities.

Restrictions on Collection of Information
Concerning U.S. Persons

Narcotics: With regard to narcotics intelligence, regulations stipulate that no CIA narcotics collection operations shall be specifically directed at individual U.S. persons abroad, except where specifically authorized by regulations dealing with physical surveillance activity directed against a U.S. person outside the U.S. who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or activities threatening the national security. In other words, the only direct action that the Agency is authorized to take against a U.S. person concerning narcotics intelligence activities is authority to conduct a physical surveillance against such a U.S. person.

Physical Surveillance Directed Against a U.S. Person Abroad: CIA is authorized to conduct a physical surveillance of a U.S. person outside the United States. Any request by an Agency component abroad for authority to conduct a

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AND METHODS INVOLVED

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physical surveillance of a U.S. person must include a statement for the reason(s) that the surveillance is believed justified under E.O. 11905. This specifies that such activity may be undertaken if the U.S. person is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities threatening the national security. This authority in the Executive Order is found in Section 5(b)(1)(iii). Normally, authority to conduct a physical surveillance against a U.S. person abroad requires the prior approval of the DDO. Chiefs of Station, however, may authorize initiation of such surveillance where time does not permit prior DDO approval. In each instance, however, the COS must notify Headquarters immediately by cable.

Unconsented Physical Search: The CIA is prohibited from conducting any unconsented physical search of persons, homes or offices in the United States. Unconsented physical searches abroad, directed against U.S. persons, are authorized by the Executive Order only under the procedures approved by the Attorney General. The important element is that prior approval by the Attorney General must be obtained for the conduct either unilaterally or by a request to a liaison service for an unconsented physical search directed against a U.S. person abroad. The phrase "unconsented physical search" means that physical intrusion upon or search of a person or the person's property or possessions for purposes other than placing an electronic surveillance device, without the knowledge or consent of the person or, in the case of property or possessions, of another individual who has the authority to consent to such a search. In addition, no force or violence against any U.S. person or threat thereof shall be used to effect any unconsented physical search. The Attorney General's procedures relating to unconsented physical searches require that the Agency must provide him facts and circumstances relating to the proposed unconsented physical search. These shall include the facts and circumstances supporting a reasonable cause to believe that the U.S. person at whom or at whose property or possessions the search is directed, is an agent of a foreign power or foreign terrorist group; the facts and circumstances relating to any intrusion which might occur upon the property or possessions of any other person; and the facts and circumstances supporting a reasonable cause to believe that the information sought is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence which cannot

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reasonably be obtained in a less intrusive manner. The only information from unconsented physical searches directed against U.S. persons abroad, retained or disclosed by CIA, shall be foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, except that other information incidentally gathered indicating involvement in activities which may be in violation of law, may be disclosed to appropriate law enforcement agencies.

Electronic Surveillance (Audio): The CIA is prohibited by Executive Order 11905, Section 5(b), from conducting any electronic surveillance activities within the U.S., except for the purpose of testing equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent with law.

The CIA is prohibited by the Attorney General's procedures from itself, or by request to foreign officials, to intentionally direct or have directed electronic surveillance (audio) against U.S. persons abroad except pursuant to prior expressed approval of the Attorney General. Any request to the Attorney General for approval of electronic surveillance (audio) directed against U.S. persons abroad shall be made by the DCI or the DDCI if the DCI delegates this authority to him, and shall provide facts and circumstances relating to the proposed electronic surveillance (audio). These shall include the facts and circumstances supporting a reasonable cause to believe that the person against whom the surveillance is directed is an agent of a foreign power or foreign terrorist group; that the facilities or premises at which the surveillance is directed or used or about to be used by such person; and that the information sought is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence which cannot reasonably be obtained in a less intrusive manner. Attorney General approval may be for a period not to exceed 90 days but extensions may be granted upon proper showing.

Electronic Surveillance - Teltaps and COMINT: The CIA is authorized to intercept only foreign communications and shall not use any selection term likely to result in the interception of protected communications except for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information or where a person has consented to a selection term designed to intercept his communication. The CIA cannot use any selection term intended to intercept the communications of a particular U.S. person or otherwise target the communications of a particular U.S. person unless the President has authorized CIA to select or target such a category and the Attorney General has authorized

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CIA to select or target the communications of the particular U.S. person involved or unless the U.S. person involved has consented to such a selection term or targeting. The Attorney General may authorize the use of such a selection term or such targeting only if he finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the U.S. person is an agent of a foreign power. In addition, the CIA cannot use any selection term intended to intercept communications that mention a particular U.S. person or otherwise target communications of other persons for the purpose of gathering information about a particular U.S. person unless the Attorney General has authorized the use of such a selection term or such targeting. The Attorney General may authorize the use of such a selection term or such targeting if he finds (a) that there is reasonable cause to believe that significant foreign intelligence will be obtained by a foreign power or its agents and that such intelligence cannot be obtained by a less intrusive manner; or (b) that the U.S. person has consented to such a selection term. Attorney General approval may be for a period not to exceed 90 days but extensions may be granted upon a proper showing.

Any intercepted foreign communication in which is revealed identity of a U.S. person as a communicant or which refers to a U.S. person, may be used and/or retained within CIA in its original form or as transcribed only in the following limited circumstances:

- (a) the identity of the United States person is deleted;
- (b) the communication is enciphered or reasonably believed to contain secret meaning;
- (c) the retention of the communication is necessary for the maintenance of technical data bases, so long as only collection personnel have access to such data bases;
- (d) the communication evidences or concerns a possible threat to the physical safety of any person;
- (e) the communication is evidence that the United States person may be an agent of a foreign power;
- (f) the communication is evidence that the United States person may be a target of intelligence activities of a foreign power;

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(g) the communication is evidence that the United States person is engaged in the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified national security information;

(h) the United States person has consented to the retention or use of communications in which he is a communicant or which refer to him;

(i) the selection of communications involving the United States person is authorized;

(j) the communication contains information relating to the physical safety of any Secret Service protectee if the dissemination of such information would not be prohibited by the restriction of Sec. 5 of E.O. 11905; or

(k) the identity of the United States person in the context of the message is significant foreign intelligence, e.g., the identity of government officials in communications between foreign powers or their agents where their identity is important to assessing the knowledge of those foreign powers. Where this exception is applied, special care must be taken by the Deputy Director for Operations to ensure that domestic political or personal information is not retained or disseminated under the mistaken belief that it is significant foreign intelligence.

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TOP SECRET

16 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Additional Answers to Questions and
Other Material Directly or Indirectly
Requested by Admiral Turner

The following items are forwarded herewith:

1. A Historical Review of Studies of the Intelligence Community
for the Commission on the organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy done in December 1974
2. The Brownell Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense.
3. Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence
chaired by General Mark Clarke.
 - a. Appendix I to the report of the Hoover Commission
Task Force on Intelligence Activities.
 - b. Appendix II to the report of the Hoover Commission
Task Force on Intelligence Activities.
 - c. Unclassified report to the Congress by the Hoover
Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities.
4. The Baker Panel Report on High Level Scientific Judgments on
Foreign Communications Intelligence.

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5. The Bissell Report of 18 February 1965.

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6. The Eaton Report of 16 August 1968.

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7. Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel - 1 July 1970. National Command and Control Capability and Defense Management.

25X

8. The Schlesinger Report of 10 March 1971.

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Note: All of the above reports are file copies from the Executive Registry and should be returned when they have served Admiral Turner's needs.

The only missing document is the Robertson Report of 1 June 1958. We have located correspondence pertaining to it but not the complete report.

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Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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Executive Registry

77-489

16 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith:

25X1

2. Memorandum from Associate General Counsel dated 15 Feb 77; Subject: Military Officer as Director of Central Intelligence. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. Reproduction of pp. 12-14 of eight questions by Senator Thurmond and answers by Mr. Bush at his hearing. [REDACTED]

X1

4. Two lists of members of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee; Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee; and accompanying note from Associate Legislative Counsel dated 15 Feb 77. [REDACTED]

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
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
- X1 6. Sealed envelope from DDA to Admiral Turner.



- X1 7. Envelope from OLC to Admiral Turner containing a copy of 11 February 1977 Congressional Record.



8. Additional clippings and articles on the Warnke nomination. Note: See item 5 of 14 Feb 77 letter of transmittal.



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Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments



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OGC 77-0988
15 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Military Officer as Director of Central Intelligence

1. Policy issues of course are raised by the question of whether a military officer should be the Director of Central Intelligence. The matter is the subject of statute also.

2. The National Security Act of 1947, which established the position of Director of Central Intelligence, as well as the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, authorizes the position of DCI to be held by a commissioned officer "whether in an active or retired status." The statute regulates in this area in several specific ways.

(a) The positions of Director and Deputy Director (a position also established by an amendment to the National Security Act and now held by Mr. Knoche) may not "be occupied simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an active or retired status."



(b) In the performance of his duties as Director or Deputy Director, a military officer "shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (military or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he were a civilian in no way connected with the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed services or any component thereof."

(c) Similarly a military officer serving as Director or Deputy Director shall possess or exercise no "supervision, control, power or functions," other than as Director or Deputy Director, with respect to the armed services or any component or personnel thereof.

(d) Service as Director or Deputy Director by a commissioned officer "shall in no way affect the status, office, rank, or grade he may occupy or hold in the armed services" or any perquisites, privileges or benefits incident to such rank or status. A commissioned officer serving as Director or Deputy Director continues to receive his authorized military pay and allowances from his department, reimbursed to that department by CIA. In addition, he is to receive from CIA "compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation established by such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and allowances."

(f) The rank or grade of such commissioned officer shall be in addition to the numbers and percentages authorized for the armed services of which he is a member.




25X1

Associate General Counsel

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002600020008-7
Seymour Bolsh

In the attached hearing at page 12
are the eight questions by Senator Thurmond
and answers by Mr. Bush which might be of
interest to Admiral Turner.



Date

15 Feb 1977

25X1

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A00260002000

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FORM 104
5-75 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

Date

Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A00260002000

That is a very general answer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been my observation in the case of other nominees who undertook this job that, as a minimum, it takes 12 months of intensive application to get on top of the job, so to speak, to get the feel of it, the many angles and ramifications. These are world-wide as you know, and certainly domestic, too.

Are you willing to put whatever intensive application is necessary into that, in order to get on top of it? Have you thought that out?

Mr. BUSH. I have thought it out. I am committed to it. I hope that my record reveals I am not opposed to hard work. Indeed I have done it since I can remember and I certainly will make that commitment—I have no other plans. My plan is to get in there. There is an awful lot of learning to be done. I have been back here a week and have not had access to much of the classified information even now, and probably that is better until the Senate disposes of this matter one way or another, but I promise you, sir, that I will set an example out there in terms of hours, in terms of hard work, that I think this committee will be proud of. I have done it before and I am prepared to do it again.

The CHAIRMAN. I ask every nominee this question; in simple terms now, boiled down, why do you agree for your name to be submitted and to undertake this job?

Mr. BUSH. I have a—I hope you understand this one. I have a sense of obligation to this country. I am one who is old fashioned in the sense that I think duty and obligation to serve still should be inculcated into every son and every daughter of every father, and I feel strongly about it. My foreign affairs experience has taught me the absolute essentiality of this work and it is for—this reason that I undertake this job—it is no more complicated than that. I did not seek this job. I was riding my bicycle in Peking, coming home from church. A messenger came up and said: "Say, there is news for you back at the office." I went back there, held up this telegram, and it was out of a cold clear blue China sky that this thing descended on me. And I thought about it, not long, thought about it and decided as I think maybe your opening comments confirmed, there is nothing in this politically for me. It is my obligation to my country and I just hope I can convince those who cannot accept that because maybe they do not know that to me that is what motivated me. I think my reply to the President of the United States when I sent it back reflected that.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not volunteer. They volunteered you.

Mr. BUSH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator THURMOND?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions that can be answered for the record in order to save time. I am very pleased with the statement Mr. Bush has made here and I suggest that he answer these questions for the record.

Mr. BUSH. Thank you, sir.

RESPONSES BY GEORGE BUSH TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Question. Mr. Ambassador, what is your concept of your job as Director of Central Intelligence?

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Answer. To provide intelligence to the President and the NSC and to coordinate intelligence from the entire intelligence community in addition to providing overall management of the intelligence community.

Question. In providing the national intelligence estimate to the President, do you feel strong differences of opinion should be noted in the final product?

Answer. Yes.

Question. How would you define the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Answer. The CIA was chartered for the purpose of coordinating intelligence activities of several departments and agencies in the interest of national security. Its major responsibilities include correlation, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence relating to the national security to the President, the National Security Council and other government departments and agencies as appropriate. To fulfill these responsibilities the CIA must administer an active program of collection and the DCI must participate in the overall coordination of Intelligence Community collection. It is clearly understood that CIA will have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions.

Question. What is your opinion of the role of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee?

Answer. The National Security Council Intelligence Committee should serve as the major communication link between the primary consumers and the producers of intelligence. The NSCIC should provide guidance to the Intelligence Community on consumers' priority needs. In addition, I believe that the NSCIC can perform a valuable function by evaluating the intelligence product. It is this kind of cycle—consumer guidance, consumer feedback—that will lead to a better and more useful intelligence product.

Question. How do you envision your interface with the Secretary of Defense?

Answer. Inasmuch as the Secretary of Defense has overall responsibility for DIA and NSA, as well as the intelligence functions of the various Services, there must be a close relationship. Prime interaction will come through meetings at the NSC. I view the Secretary of Defense both as the manager of significant intelligence resources and as a major consumer in his NSC policy making role; I view the DCI as one who presents objective intelligence to the NSC and to the President.

Question. Can you conceive of any requirement for the CIA to engage in any domestic surveillance?

Answer. No. I believe that any such activity required should be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other appropriate law enforcement bodies.

Question. Mr. Ambassador, as one who would report directly to the President, would you be inclined to accept instructions from some agent of the President, such as his staff director or possibly a Secretary of State?

Answer. As DCI, I am responsible to the President and will take his instructions in whatever manner he finds appropriate to communicate them to me. Certainly, on most routine, day-to-day matters, instructions will come through an agent of the President. However, the President has promised me direct access. I will not abuse this access, but I certainly will use it if ever have questions about the propriety of any instruction and to see that the views of the intelligence community are properly presented to the President himself.

Question. What do you envision as the chief problems of your position in view of the recent wide exposure of the CIA's responsibilities and activities?

Answer. While the current Congressional hearings have been a necessary and helpful evaluation in improving the management and oversight of the intelligence community, they have inevitably raised questions abroad about the integrity and reliability of the United States and, in addition, there are morale problems within the intelligence community. I think it is imperative that the country itself backs

the legitimate activities of the CIA. Management and control of the Agency itself could present major problems at the outset. I will take seriously the Director's responsibility "for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" and likewise working out a proper relationship with Congress is important. All of the problems are important—none appear to be insoluble.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador. It is an impressive statement you have made. Based on the remarks made already, it would appear as if you were already confirmed. But I would ask a couple of questions, and make a few comments.

First, I believe a strong economy and a sound dollar is just as important to true national security as anything else. Without an economy that is viable, this country could not preserve its system. You would agree, would you not?

Mr. BUSH. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thought so, based on your record and your extensive experience. I do not know of any man your age who has had more. Now, much of the criticism of the CIA, it is clear to me, is the fault of Congress, not just the CIA. This committee's Subcommittee on Central Intelligence has never really looked into the CIA, which it should, if it wants to assume the obligation.

As perhaps the greatest industrialist I knew once said: "If a man thinks he is being watched, it is about as good as watching him." The Central Intelligence Agency has known for many years that, in effect, it was not really being watched.

I hope you will do in this job what was done by law with respect to the Atomic Energy Act. It was difficult to get any real interest in this committee, for a long time, in the development of nuclear weapons, and difficult in the Foreign Relations Committee to get any real knowledge of the great and growing impact of nuclear weapons. It was like trying to pull teeth.

So I went on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee because under the law it is the obligation of the Atomic Energy Committee to keep the congressional committee fully informed of all developments. There I found out more about atomic weapons in a few weeks than in the previous 20 years, even though I served more than 20 years on this committee. The Backfire bomber and even more the Cruise missile are probably the two most important new items under discussion from the standpoint of the future of your children and my grandchildren: and an independent civilian analysis of these from the CIA could not be more important.

I would hope you would agree that even if not questioned, that you would come before this committee and volunteer anything that you thought was wrong in the way of foreign situations or developments, your own thinking about what would be best for the country. Would you do that?

Mr. BUSH. Senator Symington, I hope that I—I know that my experience in Congress has taught me great respect for it, and I am confident that I could cooperate fully with the proper oversight committees in that regard. And I would.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is not a direct answer, but I would hope—

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

We have just picked up from Rep. Jack Edwards, Ranking Member of our Appropriations Subcommittee in the House, that he thinks that it would be a good idea for Admiral Turner to pay courtesy calls to the House intelligence subcommittees. Apparently Mr. Sorensen paid such a courtesy call and very much impressed Edwards.

You may wish to suggest such a course of action to Admiral Turner if he has not done so already. The membership is attached. He might not have a chance to visit all the members but the Chairmen and Ranking Minority members would be helpful. Sam Stratton, a Navy Reserve Captain, who Admiral Turner may already know, would also be a good contact point.

25X1

Date

15 Feb 1977

FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS
5-75 EDITIONS

Defense Subcommittee
of the
House Appropriations Committee

George H. Mahon (D., Texas), Chairman

Robert L. F. Sikes (D., Fla.)
Daniel J. Flood (D., Pa.)
Joseph P. Addabbo (D., N.Y.)
John J. McFall (D., Calif.)
John J. Flynt (D., Ga.)
Robert N. Giaimo (D., Conn.)
Bill Chappell (D., Fla.)
Bill D. Burlison (D., Mo.)

* Jack Edwards (R., Ala.)
J. Kenneth Robinson (R., Va.)
Jack F. Kemp (R., N.Y.)
Elford Cederberg (R., Mich.)
(ex-officio member)

* Ranking Minority Member -

Intelligence and Military
Application of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee
of the
House Armed Services Committee

Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman

Charles Wilson (D., Texas)
Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.)
Dan Daniel (D., Va.)
G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.)
Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.)
Bob Carr (D., Mich.)
Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)
Samuel S. Stratton (D., N. Y.)

* Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)
William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.)
Marjorie S. Holt (R., Md.)
Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.)

* Ranking Minority Member

2/15

Executive Registry

77-482

SECRET

15 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith:

1. Memorandum for Acting DCI from D/DCI/NI dated 15 Feb 77; Subject: Projections of Soviet Civil Defense Activity.
Note: This memo answers question 1 a requested on 9 Feb 77

25X1

25X1

25X1

2. General daily newsclippings.

25X1

3. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from OGC dated 15 Feb 77; Subject: Changes in DCI Responsibilities on Shift from Peace to War.
Note: This answers question for OGC requested on 9 Feb 77

25X1

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4. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from OGC dated 14 Feb 77; Subject: Legal Relationship of the DCI and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Note: This answers question for OGC requested on 9 Feb 77

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Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002600020008-7

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

RIO 334-77

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 40/77
15 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Projections of Soviet Civil Defense Activity

1. With respect to Admiral Turner's questions about grain storage bunkers, we have no evidence that the construction of such facilities is continuing. There is little uncertainty about the size, numbers, and total capacity of the bunkers, although we have no information on how much grain is actually stored in them or for what purpose. We consider these facilities more important as an indicator of national policy for the maintenance of strategic reserves than as a major source of food in a post-attack environment (see Attachment A).

2. Admiral Turner's request for projections of other key indicators of Soviet civil defense efforts poses a more difficult problem. The unhappy truth is that the Intelligence Community's data base on the Soviet civil defense program is not sufficiently well-developed to provide a sound basis for such projections at this time. In responding to the Admiral's question, therefore, we begin by emphasizing some of the things we do not know about the Soviet program (Attachment B) and we end by outlining our efforts to rectify this situation (Attachment D). We have also provided some projections of the kind requested (Attachment C), but the sample of data on which they are based is so small and the range of uncertainty in the data is so great that the projections are driven mainly by assumptions which cannot be substantiated by facts at this time.

3. Contrary to the impression created by some press accounts, there are no significant differences within the Intelligence Community about the facts now available on Soviet civil defense activities. Admiral Turner is correct that the intelligence components of the USAF and the Department of State represent the extreme ends of a range of views in the community, but this controversy is about Soviet motives and about the strategic implications of Soviet civil defenses, not about such questions as the number of shelters identified. It should be noted, moreover, that the more extreme position taken by General Keegan on the strategic impact of current Soviet civil defenses was not supported by the JCS, although they have expressed concern about the future implications. The various collection and analysis groups

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-2-

SP - 40/77

SUBJECT: Projections of Soviet Civil Defense Activity

in the community are working together in a cooperative effort to improve the data base and to develop more definitive analyses of the scope, pace, and effectiveness of the Soviet program.

4. The projections in Attachment C were prepared by CIA. No attempt has been made to coordinate them with other intelligence agencies. Because these projections are of doubtful validity and because the Intelligence Community is working now to develop more facts and better analyses, we strongly recommend that no projections be presented to consumers of intelligence in the Administration or Congress at this time. Such presentation could lead consumers to premature conclusions and could encourage other intelligence agencies prematurely to develop rival projections.

5. For your convenience, Admiral Turner's questions are at Attachment E. The Admiral would probably also be interested in the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet civil defense which was published in November 1976.



25X1

Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

Attachments

Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002600020008-7

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-3-

SP - 40/77

SUBJECT: Projections of Soviet Civil Defense Activity

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- 1 - NIO/SP
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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

77-0468

15 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following items, responsive either directly or indirectly to requests from Admiral Turner, are forwarded herewith.

1. Suggested topics for possible use in Admiral Turner's opening statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. [redacted] 25X1
2. Response to Admiral Turner's question regarding "NIE for the Middle East" of September 1976. [redacted] 25X1
3. Personal letter for Admiral Turner from former DCI John McCone.
4. Copy of letter from Mr. Knoche to Mr. Brzezinski dated 10 February 1977 regarding [redacted] 25X1
5. Substitute page for Tab G of briefing book from OLC forwarded 14 February, Item Number 4. [redacted] 25X1

Special Assistant
to DDCI


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1 - ER w/copies of covering memos to atts.



14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Stansfield Turner


SUBJECT : Suggested Topics for Consideration
in Your Opening Statement to SSCI

A good starting point is always in the personal area. The Committee have your detailed biography, but you may wish to speak candidly of your professional achievements and qualifications for the appointment. You will wish to refer to your considerable experience as a consumer and occasional producer of intelligence. On balance, we do not believe that you need to initiate discussion of the relative merits of civilian and military incumbents of the Office of Director of Central Intelligence; on the other hand, the issue of your active-duty status has been publicly raised, and you may wish to take the initiative in commenting on this matter. Finally, it will be of interest to the Committee and to the Community if you would say some words about the origins of your appointment; this will help put on record once again the President's esteem and confidence which he has expressed in you.

Following I have listed a number of suggested topics for your consideration, and ultimately, very briefly, some topics which you may wish not to address on this occasion. All of these are the result of coordinated input here at Langley.

I am also enclosing copies of Messrs. Bush's and Knoche's nomination hearings.

25X1


Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DCI-Designate
Admiral Stansfield Turner

Stan -

Apropos of our conversation this morning about input for [redacted] In addition to all the intelligence we provided, I sent this along. It is input of this kind that I imagine you will be wanting to provide to the President in your future meetings with him.

[redacted]
E. H. Knoche

Date 2/14/77

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5-75

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25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Please have the attached substituted for the entry currently in Admiral Turner's book at Tab G. The new page will reflect recent changes in membership.

Date 15 Feb 1977

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Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii), Chairman - Bill Miller
Barry M. Goldwater (R., Ariz.), Vice Chairman - Sam Bouchard

Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans

Birch Bayh (D., Ind.), Chairman - Tom Connaughton
William D. Hathaway (D., Maine) - Mike Epstein
Joseph Biden (D., Del.) - Mark Gitenstein
Robert Morgan (D., N. Car.) - Walt Ricks
Jake Garn (R., Utah), Vice-Chairman - Stan Taylor
Clifford Case (R., N.J.) - Ed Levine
* Robert Stafford (R., Vt.) - Jean Evans

Subcommittee on Budget Authorization

William D. Hathaway (D., Maine) - Chairman - Chip Pickett
Mike Epstein
Walter Huddleston (D., Ky.) - Elliot Maxwell
Gary Hart (D., Colo.) - Rick Inderfurth
* Mark Hatfield (R., Oreg.) - Marty Gold

Other Staff - Charlie Kirbow, Danny Childs

Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality

Adlai E. Stevenson (D., Ill.), Chairman - Hal Ford
Robert Morgan (D., N. Car.) - Walt Ricks
Gary Hart (D., Colo.)
Clifford Case (R., N.J.), Vice-Chairman - Ed Levine

Other Staff - Anne Karalekas, Ted Ralston

Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines

Walter Huddleston (D., Ky.), Chairman - Elliot Maxwell
Birch Bayh (D., Ind.) - Tom Connaughton
Adlai Stevenson (D., Ill.) - Hal Ford
Joseph Biden (D., Del.) - Mark Gitenstein
* Mark Hatfield (R., Oreg.) - Marty Gold
* Strom Thurmond (R., S. C.)
Jake Garn (R., Utah) - Stan Taylor

Other Staff - Martha Talley

* - Gave up membership - Feb. 1977 (Replacements designated so far are Daniel P. Moynihan (D. N. Y.) and Charles Mathias (R., Md.). Two additional Members to be named.
Approved For Release 2003/07/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002600020008-7

2/14

77-0460

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

25X1

SUBJECT : Additional Answers to Questions and
Other Material Directly or Indirectly
Requested by Admiral Turner

The following items are forwarded herewith:

1. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from Assistant to the
Deputy Director dated 11 February 1977; Subject: CIA
Relationship with Academia. Note: This is an addendum
to the Inspector General's memo of 9 February on same
subject. [REDACTED]
2. Memorandum for Admiral Turner from Deputy General Counsel
dated 14 February 1977; Subject: Material Requested by
[REDACTED] for Use in Preparation for Your Confirma-
tion Hearings. Note: This answers the question for the
General Counsel raised by the Admiral on 11 February.
[REDACTED]
3. Personal-Sensitive document for Admiral Turner from
DDA. [REDACTED]
4. Briefing Book entitled Material for Confirmation Hearing
of Admiral Stansfield Turner from OLC. Answers eight
questions for OLC request on 9, 10, and 11 February.
[REDACTED]

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
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
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5. Two volumes of Stenographic Transcripts of Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations U. S. Senate of Paul C. Warnke. See pages 21-170 for Warnke testimony.

25X1



25X1



Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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11 February 1977

MEMORANDUM

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FROM:




Assistant to the Deputy Director

SUBJECT: CIA Relationships with Academe

The attached paper, "The CIA in Academia" by Professor Gordon B. Baldwin of the University of Wisconsin College of Law is submitted as an addendum to the Inspector General's memorandum of 9 February on the subject.

25X1



77-3380

14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Turner

25X1

FROM :

[REDACTED]
Deputy General Counsel

25X1

SUBJECT :

Material Requested by [REDACTED] for
Use in Preparation for Your Confirmation
Hearings

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
In a memorandum from [REDACTED] dated 12 February 1977, he listed additional items on which you wanted specific answers or citations. One of the items was assigned to the Office of General Counsel. It was as follows:

What changes in Executive Order 11905 have been made by the Carter Administration? Has a new Executive Order been issued to confirm these changes? In particular, he wished to know what effect these changes will have on the CFI and the role of the DCI.

I am attaching a paper relating to this question.

25X1

Attachment



14 February 1977

Changes Effected in Executive Order 11905

Only two changes have been made thus far in Executive Order 11905. A new Executive order has not been issued to confirm these changes.

Presidential Directive/NSC-2, dated 20 January 1977, reorganized the National Security Counsel system and created, under the National Security Counsel, the NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC). By memorandum of 26 January 1977 the Assistant to the President for National Security affairs announced that the full functions and responsibilities of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) would be assumed by the NSC Policy Review Committee and that the full functions and responsibilities of the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) would be assumed by the NSC Special Coordinating Committee, in addition to the other functions of these committees. That memorandum advised that otherwise Executive Order 11905 remained in full effect.

Note: Any further changes to E.O. 11905 are pending the results of Policy Review Memorandum/NSC-11 still in draft. A copy of the draft PRM/NSC-11 is attached for the National Security Council Action Data-Presidential Directives and Review Memoranda Schedules notebook.

SECRET

**MATERIAL FOR
CONFIRMATION HEARING**

OF

ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER

Office of Legislative Counsel

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- A. Pros and cons of an open budget, including public comments made by President Carter during election campaign and subsequent to the election (Ref Item 4)
- B. Differences between the requirements for disclosure of covert operations under Senate Resolution 400 and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (Ref Item 11)
- C. A list of questions and suggested answers (Q and A's) that might come up during the confirmation hearing (Refs Item 14 and Enclosure 2, Item 2)
- D. Rundown on congressional leaks (experiences) (Ref Item 15e)
- E. Rundown on Terms of Reference for the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Ref 15f)
- F. Background information on Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with respect to intelligence activities (Ref Enclosure 2, Item 1)
- G. Listing of the membership of the subcommittees and ad hoc committees of the Select Committee (Ref Enclosure 2, Item 3)
- H. Kinds of intelligence which could be of use to committees and subcommittees of Congress (Ref Enclosure 2, Item 4)
- I. Information Briefings of Congress during 1976

HEARINGS

Before The

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NOMINATION OF

RICHARD B. PARKER, OF KANSAS, TO BE AMBASSADOR

TO THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

PAUL C. WARNKE, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO
BE DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING
HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS DIRECTOR

Washington, D. C.

February 8, 1977

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

Official Reporters

300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.

HEARINGS

Before The

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NOMINATION OF PAUL WARNKE

TO BE

DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D. C.

February 9, 1977

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.

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300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

SUBJECT

: Answers to Questions and Other Material
Directly or Indirectly Requested by
Admiral Turner

The following items are forwarded herewith:

1. Memorandum for DCI-Designate Admiral Turner from General Counsel dated 14 Feb 77; Subject: Papers Requested by [Redacted] for Use in Preparation for Your Confirmation Hearings. [Redacted] Note: This memo answers questions 1, 2, and 3 for the General Counsel requested on 10 February 1977.
2. Memorandum and Briefing Book for Admiral Turner dated 14 Feb 77; Subject: Directorate of Science and Technology Background Documents. [Redacted] Note: Admiral Turner may find the memo and briefing book useful as background for his meeting with Mr. Les Dirks, DDS&T, at 1030 hours, Tuesday 15 February.
3. Memorandum for Office of the Director of Central Intelligence from Acting Staff Secretary, NSC, dated 11 Feb 77; Subject: Status Report on PRMs. [Redacted] Note: This memo should be added to the National Security Council Action Data-Presidential Directives and Review Memoranda Schedules notebook prepared by ODCI Executive Secretariat after tab entitled Presidential Review Memoranda.

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : Answers to Questions and Other Material
Directly or Indirectly Requested by
Admiral Turner

The following items are forwarded herewith:

1. Memorandum for DCI-Designate Admiral Turner from General Counsel dated 14 Feb 77; Subject: Papers Requested by [Redacted] for Use in Preparation for Your Confirmation Hearings. [Redacted] Note: This memo answers questions 1, 2, and 3 for the General Counsel requested on 10 February 1977.
2. Memorandum and Briefing Book for Admiral Turner dated 14 Feb 77; Subject: Directorate of Science and Technology Background Documents. [Redacted] Note: Admiral Turner may find the memo and briefing book useful as background for his meeting with Mr. Les Dirks, DDS&T, at 1030 hours, Tuesday 15 February.
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[Redacted]

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4. American Intelligence: A Framework for the Future [redacted] a CIA Study Group Report dated 13 October 1975. See note attached to book from Richard Lehman, D/DCI/NI. 25X
5. Collection of clippings and articles on the Warnke nomination and hearings requested in your memo of 12 February (received here 14 February). I have also ordered the full transcript of the Warnke hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. We should receive it sometime tomorrow.
6. General daily newsclippings which you will receive on a regular basis.
7. Answer to Question for Acting DCI regarding the Hollingsworth Report requested on 10 February. [redacted] 25X1
8. Copy of NIE 11-3/8-76: Soviet Forces for International Conflict Through the Mid-1980s and other related documents. Admiral Turner may wish to review these documents before his meeting with Richard Lehman scheduled for 1000 hours, Wednesday 15 February. [redacted] 25X
9. Presidential Directive/NSC-3 for the Director of Central Intelligence from President Carter dated 11 February 1977; Subject: Disposition of National Security Decision Memoranda. [redacted] Note: This memo should be added to the National Security Council Action Data-Presidential Directives and Review Memoranda Schedules notebook after tab entitled Presidential Directives. [redacted] 25X

Special Assistant
to DDCI

Attachments

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Turner

The attached study of intelligence organization may be of interest to you. It was prepared in the fall of 1975 at Bill Colby's request by a group of six CIA officers. Our report has no official standing, but it served to define the issues for the Presidential review of intelligence organization and management that culminated in E.O. 11905. I would recommend your reading Parts I and II and Part III through Page 66. The Options themselves are pretty well overtaken by the executive order and the annexes are of less importance and uneven quality. I would particularly invite your attention to Pages 21 to 33, which deal with the DCI's relationships with the Department of Defense and Pages 75 to 77, which suggest one approach to improving this relationship.



Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

Attachment

25X

12 February 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

Special Assistant to DDCI

FROM:

[Redacted]

25X1

Please provide Admiral Turner with a digest of clippings
and articles on the Warnke Hearings.

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QUESTION FOR THE ACTING DCI

Senator Nunn asked me what the Community's position is on Hollingsworth's report about the potential of the Warsaw Pact for a surprise ground-air attack in Central Europe.

ANSWER

General Hollingsworth's study focuses on the combat readiness of US Army forces in Central Europe. He finds a number of serious deficiencies which, in his view, lead to the conclusion that "the US Army in Europe is not ready to fight on short notice." He recommends measures to correct the deficiencies. His findings are largely independent of the threat situation.

The question of how much warning the US and NATO can expect to have of Warsaw Pact preparation for war in Europe is now under study by the Community and will be addressed in a forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate. The CIA view follows.

Hollingsworth's premise is that a 48-hour readiness capability is required to meet what he alleges is the generally held view in NATO that the Pact could mount a 54-division attack with little or no warning. CIA believes that this premise fails to take sufficient account of constraints on the Pact's own readiness and seriously overstates its capabilities for sudden attack. These constraints include:

- peacetime undermanning of East European and Soviet units.
- the need to set up the command and control apparatus to control the buildup and deployment of the forces.
- the need for the Pact countries to conduct a general mobilization which would involve calling up millions of reservists and tens of thousands of trucks.
- Soviet uncertainty about the reliability and effective cooperation of the East European Allies (half of the 54 divisions postulated by Hollingsworth would be East European), and

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14 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Turner

1. While I am sure you are pressed for time, I want to make the attached documents available to you before our meeting Wednesday morning. They are: NIE 11-3/8-76; the agreement reached among Mr. Bush, Mr. Cherne, and General Scowcroft under which the competitive analysis experiment was conducted; the report of Team B on Soviet strategic objectives (The Pipes Report); and a draft comment by the NIO for Strategic Programs on the Pipes Report.

2. As your time is limited, I would recommend that you read the Key Judgments section of 11-3/8, Pages 1 to 15, and Chapter 1 of the Summary Estimate, Pages 16 to 24. Volume II of the estimate is a more detailed presentation and is still at the printers, as is Volume III, the Annexes.

3. The rest of 11-3/8 and the documents relating to the experiment I am simply making available for your scanning. I have not included the two technical Team B reports, but they are also available if you wish to see them.



Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of National Intelligence Estimate
11-3/8-76, "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental
Conflict Through the Mid-1980s"

FROM: George Bush

1. The attached National Intelligence Estimate is the official appraisal of the Director of Central Intelligence. This Estimate, including its italicized statements of differing views by members of The National Foreign Intelligence Board, was drafted and coordinated by professional intelligence officers of the US Intelligence Community and was approved by me with the advice of the Board.
2. The judgments arrived at in this Estimate were made after all parties to the Estimate had the benefit of alternative views from the various elements of the Community and from panels of experts from outside government on a few selected subjects. The assembling of the panels of outside experts, and the consideration of their views, was agreed upon by me and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an experiment, the purpose of which was to determine whether those known for their more somber views of Soviet capabilities and objectives could present the evidence in a sufficiently convincing way to alter the analytical judgments that otherwise would have been presented in the attached document. The views of these experts did have some effect. But to the extent that this Estimate presents a starker appreciation of Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives, it is but the latest in a series of estimates that have done so as evidence has accumulated on the continuing persistence and vigor of Soviet programs in the strategic offensive and defensive fields.

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3. The experiment in competitive analysis that was begun with this Estimate has not been completed, and any final judgment on its utility cannot be rendered. Nevertheless, there is a negative aspect that is already clear and which concerns me deeply; namely, the selective leaks regarding the details of the process and, worse, the substantive conclusions developed by the "Team B" panel that was concerned with Soviet strategic objectives. Inspired by these selective leaks, allegations have appeared in the press that the judgments appearing in this official Estimate were shaped by pressure from the "Team B."

4. There is no truth to such allegations. The judgments in the attached Estimate are the best that can be made on the basis of the analysis of the available evidence.

5. Although these leaks may appear to discredit what I continue to regard as a worthwhile experiment, they have not diminished the integrity of the Estimate itself, nor the integrity of the Intelligence Community.


George Bush

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Operations Center

12 February 1977

Admiral Turner:

Mr. Knoche asked us to forward to you
a copy of the letter he has sent to the
President. The letter was dispatched this
morning to Mr. Aaron at the White House.



Senior Duty Officer

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
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REMARKS:		
<p>This was given to Admiral Turner by Mr. Knoche on 10 February 1977.</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
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REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

BOOK I

NOVEMBER 1976

DCI/IC 76-4634

Prepared for:
President-elect Carter
Transition Team

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

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AUTHORITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR DUTIES", 22 JULY 1976 . . . G

"THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE" H
A 12 August 1976 22-page text prepared by the D/DCI/NI
and provided as background to President-Elect Carter as
part of his intelligence orientation briefings. It is
marked, "For Official Use Only".

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THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING PROCESS

BOOK II

NOVEMBER 1976



Prepared for:
President-elect Carter
Transition Team

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~~II.~~ INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PLANNING

- The Planning Process
 - System description
 - Short-range documents
 - Mid-range documents
 - Long-range documents
- Draft Planning Documents Included
 - KIQ's
 - Goals and Objectives
 - Perspectives for Intelligence Planning and Programming
 - DCID 1/2 "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities"
 - National Foreign Intelligence Requirements for Planning and Programming
- Other Guidance/Regulatory Documents
 - NSCID's
 - CFID's
 - DCID's

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PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

BOOK III

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NOVEMBER 1976



Prepared for:
President-elect Carter
Transition Team

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PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING

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COLLECTION AND PRODUCT EVALUATION

BOOK IV

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NOVEMBER 1976



Prepared for:
President-elect Carter
Transition Team

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Approved For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP80M00165A002600020008-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Three books describing the Intelligence Community were provided to Admiral Turner on 11 Feb by Admiral Murphy. These books were the same as those provided the Carter Transition team.

I have table of contents for each books if someone wished to know exactly what they contained.

[REDACTED]
Dick Kerr
EO/ICS

Date


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FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



11 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

SUBJECT : Admiral Turner's Question: "Comments about CIA and intelligence made by President Carter prior to and subsequent to the election"

President Carter has made very few public comments about the CIA or about intelligence. Other than his remark that he has confidence in Mr. Knoche and that the CIA is in good hands (see 2 February Washington Star article attached as Tab A), the most pertinent Carter statement was in Time of 3 January (extract attached as Tab A), when he said that he will not make "precipitous changes" in the Intelligence Community and that his knowledge of the Community outside the CIA was very limited. He has made no public statement (of which we are aware) since 20 January that would imply a change in his 3 January position. In response to questions about an "intelligence czar," he said he hadn't decided whether or not to change the present arrangement where the DCI already is a kind of "intelligence czar."

(NOTE: Prior to his swearing-in, the President-elect discussed intelligence, the Community, and CIA privately with George Bush and other CIA officials. I hold the classified file on these sensitive discussions and can make it available to Admiral Turner when he wishes - although none of the material is public and therefore could not be used during the Admiral's open confirmation hearings. In addition, Richard Lehman (Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence) was in charge of intelligence support to the President-elect, met with him on several occasions, and is prepared to brief Admiral Turner on these meetings.)

A. Specific Statements: post-election (attached as Tab A)

-- 19 December 1976 New York Times article. President-elect states he is studying the question of separating the functions of the DCI and the head of CIA in the light


of his wish to have more than one source of intelligence coming to him. (NOTE: This concept was of considerable interest to Vice-President Mondale when he served on the Church Committee. We will send you material from the Church Committee report shortly.)

- 1 December 1976 Victor Zorza article and 17 November 1976 Economist (Foreign Report) article. The Zorza article is written on the basis of interviews with Schlesinger, Tom Hughes, and Ray Cline, the latter two of whom have published very specific ideas about CIA and Community organization. The Economist article sets forth Cline's views.
- 20 November - 1 December 1976: Several articles centered on the George Bush 19 November sensitive intelligence briefing of the President-elect. These articles contain no direct quotes from the President-elect.

B. Specific Statements: pre-election (attached as Tab B)

- 8 October 1976 transcript of Ford/Carter debate of 7 October. Governor Carter refers to "CIA revelations" as contributing to the "deep hurt" done to the American people, and includes CIA in a list of situations such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Pakistan, Angola, and Watergate. He also deplores "secrecy" in negotiations and the "secret treaties" which have supported dictatorships and ignored human rights.
- 25 September 1976 transcript of Ford/Carter debate of 24 September. President Ford referred to his reorganization of the Intelligence Community, but as Governor Carter began his reply by pointing out there has been a breakdown in the trust of the American people in their government, the television audio failed. (NOTE: There was one accusation that the CIA had been responsible for this failure.) When the debate renewed, Governor Carter said that there was too much government secrecy and not enough respect for the privacy of American citizens. He later said that the "U.S. system of government - in spite of Vietnam, Cambodia, CIA, Watergate - is still the best system." (NOTE: Governor Carter's references to CIA and revelations about it were not expanded on by the press. Since the election, we have seen no statements of a like nature.)

- CONFIDENTIAL
- 14 August 1976 Washington Star article revealing Governor Carter's public endorsement of DCI Bush as having instituted the changes in CIA required by Congress. (NOTE: This statement by Governor Carter was welcomed by CIA because it helped take CIA [and intelligence generally] as an issue out of the political campaign.)
 - 22 July 1976: Governor Carter requests briefings on intelligence and foreign affairs from the CIA rather than from State. The article speculates that Governor Carter thought State's briefings would be colored by policy considerations.



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SA/DCI


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11 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:



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Please provide the following reports for Admiral Turner:

1. The Brownell Report to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
2. The Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence Activities, June 13, 1955, June 14, 1955, including 87-page report and appendixes
3. The Baker Report of September 20, 1957
4. The Robertson Report, June 1, 1958
5. The Bissell Report, February 18, 1965
6. The Eaton Report, August 16, 1968
7. The Intelligence Supplement to the Blue Ribbon Report, July 1, 1970
8. The Schlesinger Report of March 10, 1971

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Executive Secretary
77-422/1

11 February 1977

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Answers to Questions Requested
by Admiral Turner on 10 February 1977

The following item is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum for Admiral Stansfield Turner on
the subject of Agency personnel matters from
DDA.

Special Assistant
to DDCI

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DDA 77-0798

11 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral Stansfield Turner
FROM : John F. Blake
Deputy Director for Administration

Sir:

This memorandum forwards to you the information
desired on personnel matters as called to our attention

25X1

[REDACTED] on Thursday, 10 February
1977.

[REDACTED]

ILLEGIB

John F. Blake

Att

Distribution:
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CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION FOR DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

1. I would like to get some gross statistics and data on our people:
 - a. Total number.
 - b. Total number by pay grade.
 - c. Total number in Washington.
 - d. Total number elsewhere in the United States.
 - e. Total number overseas.
2. For our career employees, what is the normal retirement procedure?
 - a. Length of service and qualifications for retirement.
 - b. How many retired CIA employees are presently re-employed?
 - c. How many of those re-employed are employed as full-time consultants?
 - d. As part-time consultants?

77-423/2

11 February 1977

25X1 NOTE FOR: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Material for Admiral Turner

25X1 In line with my conversation with [REDACTED] yesterday
25X1 and your subsequent conversation with [REDACTED] attached for
Admiral Turner are the hearings on the nominations of the following:

John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence
William F. Raborn, Jr., Director of Central Intelligence
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
George Bush, Director of Central Intelligence
E. Henry Knoche, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Also included is a copy of a Top Secret transcript of testimony by Mr. Bush, Admiral Murphy, and Mr. Knoche before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which in effect constituted Mr. Knoche's confirmation hearings and otherwise contains good insight into the particular interests of various members. There is also attached a draft history of the CIA section of the National Security Act of 1947. Of particular interest for background purposes is Chapter VIII entitled "Civilian Status of DCI" (pages 82-102). Finally, also included is a copy of the transcript of the nomination hearing of Theodore C. Sorensen.

25X1

[REDACTED]
Deputy Legislative Counsel

Attachments:
As stated

11 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]

SUBJECT : Addendum to 10 February 1977 List of
Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

The following additional items are forwarded herewith:

1. Memorandum for Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the subject of National Estimates to Congress from ADCI. [Redacted]
2. Memorandum for the Record, Subject: ADCI Meeting with Secretary Brown dated 4 February 1977 from AD/DCI/IC. [Redacted]
3. Paper on the CIA Directorate of Administration dated December 1976. [Redacted]

[Redacted]
Special Assistant
to DDCI

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
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
10 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:




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SUBJECT : Budget Reductions, 1978 CIA Program



Attached per Admiral Turner's request of 1100 hours today is a prioritized list of possible reductions against the 1978 CIA budget request.




Special Assistant
to DDCI

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10 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials for Admiral Turner

Forwarded herewith are briefing materials either requested by Admiral Turner or which are believed to be of special interest to Admiral Turner. These materials are as follows:

1. CIA Congressional Budget Submission, Fiscal Year 1978, and accompanying memorandum dated 9 February 1977.
2. National Security Council Action Data - Presidential Directives and Review Memoranda Schedules.
3. Special Coordination Committee - Review of Covert Action and Other Special Activities.
4. DCI/DDCI Senior Staff and CIA - Functional Summary Data.
5. Principle Officers of the Central Intelligence Agency
6. Briefing Book on the Operations Directorate (DDO).
7. Inspection Schedules, Office of the Inspector General.
8. Regulations and Activities Ensuring Compliance with Law and Propriety from Inspector General.

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
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- 25X1 9. CIA Relationships with Academe from the Inspector General. [REDACTED]
- 25X1 10. Consumers Guide to the Intelligence Community and its Products. [REDACTED] 25X1
11. Memorandum from the Legislative Counsel on Congressional Committees Briefed During 1976. [REDACTED]
- 25X1 12. Memorandum from SA/DCI, Subject: Military Officers as DCI. [REDACTED]
13. Guide to CIA Statutes and Law with Enclosures: Senate Resolution 400 and Executive Order 11905. [REDACTED] 25X1
- 25X1 14. Press Clippings on DCI-Designate for period 1-10 February 1977. [REDACTED]
15. Copy of the Murphy Commission Report dated June 1975. (Commission on Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy). [REDACTED] 25X1
16. Copy of the Rockefeller Commission Report dated June 1975. (Report to the President on CIA Activities within the United States) [REDACTED] 25X1
- 25X1 17. Six volumes of the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Church Committee) and seven volumes of hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. [REDACTED]
- 25X1 18. Six volumes of hearings of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) and one volume on Recommendations of the House Select Committee dated 11 February 1976. [REDACTED]
- 25X1 19. Copies of two issues of Village Voice which published a leaked version of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) report on its investigations. Please note that this report was never released by the House of Representatives and therefore has no official status. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Special Assistant
to DDCI



10 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Operations

VIA:

SUBJECT:

Request from Admiral Turner re CIA
Views on his Planned Farewell Calls
in NATO Area

1. ACTION: Please advise concurrence, per paragraph 6 below.

2. LCDR Williams of Admiral Turner's staff telephoned today and advised that Admiral Turner, at General Haig's request, will make his farewell calls in Europe after his Senate hearings concluding soon after 22 February and before he is sworn in as Director by the President. Admiral Turner wishes CIA views concerning "security considerations" that might affect these activities in Europe.

3. Admiral Turner will visit:

NATO Headquarters (Brussels)
SHAPE Headquarters (Belgium)

Rome

Athens

Ankara

4. Although security for Admiral Turner will be the responsibility of the U.S. military and their counterparts in the host countries, it is clear that the public knowledge that the Admiral is DCI-designate will add to the security question. In addition, although he is making calls in his NATO capacity, it is highly probable his interlocutors will be thinking about his new role. Consequently, it will be necessary for CIA to comment

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to Admiral Turner not only on the security question, but also to recommend how the natural interest of his hosts in his new position should be handled.

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1- ES info
2- SA/DCI for file

Executive Registry
77-421

25X1

10 February 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT:

Military Officers as DCI

REFERENCE:

Your Memorandum Dated 9 February 1977

1. In response to Admiral Turner's question concerning military officers who have served as DCI, the date of their incumbencies and whether or not they were on active or retired status while serving, you will note from the attached list that each of the first four DCI's was a military officer on active duty. All subsequent DCI's have been civilians, with the exception of VADM Raborn, who had retired from active duty before he became DCI.

2. It may also be of interest that of the six CIA Deputy Directors who were military officers, all of them were on active duty during their incumbencies and did not retire until after leaving CIA.

/s/

SA/DCI

25X1

SA/DCI/dkg/kgt/10 February 1977

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Directors

Sidney William Souers
Rear Admiral, USNR
23 January 1946-10 June 1946

ACTIVE DUTY
(RET. JAN, 1953)

**The Honorable
John Alex McCone**
29 November 1961-28 April 1965

Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg
Lieutenant General, USA
10 June 1946-1 May 1947

ACTIVE DUTY
(RET. JUNE 1953)

William Francis Raborn, Jr. ALREADY
Vice Admiral, USN (Retired) RETIRED
28 April 1965-30 June 1966

Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter
Rear Admiral, USN
1 May 1947-7 October 1950

ACTIVE DUTY
(RET. AUG, 1957)

**The Honorable
Richard Helms**
30 June 1966-2 February 1973

Walter Bedell Smith
General, USA
7 October 1950-9 February 1953

ACTIVE DUTY
(RET. FEB, 1953)

**The Honorable
James R. Schlesinger**
2 February 1973-2 July 1973

**The Honorable
Allen Welsh Dulles***
26 February 1953-29 November 1961

**The Honorable
William E. Colby**
4 September 1973-30 January 1976

*Mr. Dulles served as Acting DCI from
9 to 26 February 1953.

**The Honorable
George Bush**
30 January 1976- 20 JAN 1977

Deputy Directors

**The Honorable
Kingman Douglas***
2 March 1946-11 July 1946

Edwin Kennedy Wright | *ACTIVE DUTY*
Brigadier General, USA | *(RET. SEPT 1955)*
20 January 1947-9 March 1949

**The Honorable
William Harding Jackson**
7 October 1950-3 August 1951

**The Honorable
Allen Welsh Dulles**
23 August 1951-26 February 1953

Charles Pearre Cabell | *ACTIVE DUTY*
General, USAF | *(RET. JAN 1962)*
23 April 1953-31 January 1962

Marshall Sylvester Carter | *ACTIVE DUTY*
Lieutenant General, USA | *(RET. AUG 1969)*
3 April 1962-28 April 1965

**The Honorable
Richard Helms**
28 April 1965-30 June 1966

Rufus Lackland Taylor | *ACTIVE DUTY*
Vice Admiral, USN | *(ACT FEB 1969)*
13 October 1966-31 January 1969

Robert Everton Cushman, Jr. | *ACTIVE DUTY*
Lieutenant General, USMC | *(RET JULY 1969)*
7 May 1969-31 December 1971

Vernon Anthony Walters | *ACTIVE DUTY*
Lieutenant General, USA** | *(RET JULY 1976)*
2 May 1972-7 July 1976

**The Honorable
E. Henry Knoche**
7 July 1976-

*Mr. Douglas served as Acting DDCI from
2 March through 11 July 1946.

**General Walters served as Acting DCI from
3 July through 3 September 1973.